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William Clare Roberts’ recent book, Marx’s Inferno: The Political Theory 
of Capital, provides a novel and interesting interpretation of the first 
volume of Marx’s masterpiece. Roberts argues, controversially, that 
Volume 1 of Capital presents a stand-alone piece of political theory. 
His two over-arching theses are that (1) Capital Volume 1 aspired to 
provide “the definitive analysis of what’s wrong with capitalism” and 
(2) that this is based “on rewriting Dante’s Inferno as a descent into 
the modern ‘social Hell’ of the capitalist mode of production” (p. 
1). He does this in part by emphasising the many different strands 
of socialist theory that Marx was responding to, which include an 
important and oft-overlooked strain of radical republican thought. It 
is clear, well-researched, original, and well worth reading for anyone 
with an interest not only in Marx and Marxist political theory, but 
in freedom, domination, republicanism, and critiques of capitalist 
economic institutions as well.
Roberts begins by arguing that Volume 1 of Marx’s Capital be read 
and understood as essentially a work of political theory on its own, 
independently of the other two volumes and Marx’s work thereon, 
and thereafter arguing that Marx modelled the structure of Capital 
Volume 1 on that of Dante’s Inferno. Roberts’ thesis has elicited a 
well-known debate with David Harvey, who argues that the three 
volumes of Marx’s Capital can only be understood as a whole, partly 
because Marx’s full political economy of capitalism only comes to 
fruition with Volumes 2 and 3. However, I think it’s worth making 
the point that even if, like Harvey, we want to argue contra Roberts 
that Marx is developing a theory of political economy in Capital, and 
that that theory can only properly be understood by reading all three 
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volumes, Roberts’ book still has a much to recommend it for its read-
ing of Marx’s account of capitalist domination and unfreedom, and 
how it connects various parts of Marx’s argument to the disagree-
ments he had with the other socialists of his day. In other words, we 
should avoid the temptation of thinking that either Marx was produc-
ing a political theory with significant normative import in Capital or 
he was developing a theory of political economy. We can accept both 
that Marx was developing a theory of political economy, which only 
comes to full fruition at the end, and that it has important theoreti-
cal lessons and implications about how capitalism is dominating and 
unfree, what sort of system would be required to replace it, and so 
on. To be clear, this is not a temptation I think Roberts or Harvey 
(in his critique of Roberts) fall into; it is a one I think some of their 
readers may risk, and would do well to avoid.
Roberts goes on to argue that in Part I of Capital Marx presents 
an analysis of the market unfreedom inherent in capitalism. On this 
view, the capitalist marketplace implies subjecting its participants 
to a form of impersonal domination, insofar as market actors are 
made dependent on the imposed demands of consumers in the mar-
ketplace, without being able to contest or demand justification of 
them. As I will return to below, this seems to deviate somewhat 
from the standard neo-Roman or republican concept of freedom, 
according to which freedom is freedom from domination, and domi-
nation in turn is spelled out as being subject to the will or arbitrary 
power of another (either a person or an institution coherent enough 
to be construed as having a will). (Note that I here prefer the term 
‘neo-Roman’ to ‘republican’ conceptions of freedom for essentially 
the same reason that Quentin Skinner does: because it is possible to 
advocate monarchy (indeed over a republic) on the basis of such a 
concept of liberty.) Roberts’ following chapters discuss Marx’s the-
ory of exploitation in its historical context and his analysis of how 
capitalism develops the productive forces without enriching labour-
ers, makes labourers increasingly dependent on capital, and even 
generates the illusion that capitalist domination is really an instance 
of freedom. Chapter 6 discusses Marx’s writings on primitive accu-
mulation, showing how Marx, against many of his contemporaries, 
is keen to distinguish feudalism from capitalism, show how the de-
velopment of capitalism renders many of his contemporaries’ ideas 
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about alternative economic institutions—such as a return to small-
scale production—impossible, and show how the capitalist state is 
intrinsically tied up with the need for capital accumulation, seen e.g. 
through capitalist imperialism and colonialism.
The final chapter ties the different strands of Roberts’ argument 
together to argue that Marx adheres to a neo-Roman concept of 
freedom, which he uses to critique capitalism. Here Roberts argues 
against reading Marx as having a positive concept of freedom as self-
mastery, self-direction, and so on, in favour of a commitment to 
freedom as non-domination. However, he argues, this represents a 
radicalisation of neo-Roman freedom to include not only familiar 
forms of personal domination—e.g. between the master and slave, 
monarch and subject, or boss and worker—but also forms of imper-
sonal domination. This raises an interesting question: if freedom is 
opposed to domination, but domination no longer consists in being 
subject to the will or arbitrary power of another, do we still have a 
case of neo-Roman freedom? If you accept an analysis of impersonal 
domination like Marx’s, it seems to me that you have two ways to 
go. Either you can retain freedom as freedom from being subject to 
the will or arbitrary power of another, and only oppose freedom to 
personal forms of domination (and not impersonal forms). Or you 
can retain freedom as the opposite of domination tout court, but end 
up with a different concept of freedom than the standard neo-Roman 
one. It would be different from the standard neo-Roman concept 
of freedom because domination, on this view, no longer consists in 
being subject to the will or arbitrary power of an other of the right 
sort—either a single person or an organisation unified and coher-
ent enough to be said to have a will. A natural suggestion here is 
that Marx has a positive concept of freedom, which can, unlike the 
neo-Roman concept generally discussed, be thwarted by both per-
sonal and impersonal forms of domination. Roberts wants to retain 
freedom as the opposite of domination and accept that there are im-
personal forms of domination, but it’s left unclear whether, and if 
so how, a recognisably neo-Roman concept of freedom can do this 
work.
Marx’s Inferno is naturally notable for its argument that Marx 
structures Capital Volume 1 along the lines of Dante’s Inferno (a claim 
which is not entirely new, but is undoubtedly well made) and for its 
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contextual analysis of Marx’s argument in light of the other socialist 
authors of his time he was responding to, including Charles Fou-
rier, Saint-Simon, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, and Robert Owen. But 
this is far from all that the book has to offer. For one, it puts Marx 
into fruitful dialogue with neo-Roman conceptions of freedom in 
the context of critically assessing capitalist economic institutions. In 
so doing, Roberts connects his work to Alex Gourevitch’s recent 
book on the role of neo-Roman conceptions of freedom in the early 
US labour movement (Alex Gourevitch, From Slavery to the Coopera-
tive Commonwealth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) 
(p. 7–8). Much traditional writing on neo-Roman conceptions of 
freedom focus overwhelmingly on early modern, aristocratic, and 
anti-democratic thinkers. Roberts and Gourevitch both stick out in-
sofar as they (1) extend our knowledge of neo-Roman concepts and 
ideas into the 19th Century, (2) focus on much more radical think-
ers, who, among other things, (3) use these ideas to critically exam-
ine the economic structure of capitalist society and (4) think about 
which alternative economic institutions should replace them. These 
momentous questions are increasingly being discussed today, and 
Roberts’ book makes an important contribution to both asking and 
answering them.
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